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Abstract
We study a rating system in which a set of individuals (e.g., the customers
of a restaurant) evaluate a given service (e.g, the restaurant), with their aggregated
opinion determining the probability of all individuals to use the service and thus its
generated revenue. We explicitly model the influence relation by a social network,
with individuals being influenced by the evaluation of their trusted peers. On top
of that we allow a malicious service provider (e.g., the restaurant owner) to bribe
some individuals, i.e., to invest a part of his or her expected income to modify their
opinion, therefore influencing his or her final gain. We analyse the effect of bribing
strategies under various constraints, and we show under what conditions the system
is bribery-proof, i.e., no bribing strategy yields a strictly positive expected gain to
the service provider.
1 Introduction
Imagine to be the owner of a new and still relatively unknown restaurant. The quality
of food is not spectacular and the customers you have seen so far are only limited to a
tiny number of friends of yours. Your account on Tripadvisor R© has received no review
and your financial prospects look grim at best. There is one easy solution to your
problems: you ask your friends to write an enthusiastic review for you, in exchange for
a free meal. After this, Tripadvisor R© lists your restaurant as excellent and the number
of customers, together with your profit, suddenly florishes.
Systems such as Tripadvisor R©, where a small proportion of customers writes re-
views and influences a large number of potential customers, are not bribery-proof: each
restaurant owner - or the owner of whichever service - is able to offer a compensation
- monetary or not - in exchange for positive evaluation, having an impact on the whole
set of potential customers. Tripadvisor R© is based on what we call “Objective Rating”,
or O-rating: individual evaluations are aggregated into a single figure, which is seen
by, and thus influences, every potential customer.
What we study in this paper is a system in which each individual only receives the
evaluation given by the set of trusted peers, his or her friends, and only this aggregated
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opinion influences his or her decision. This is what we call “Personalised Rating”, or
P-rating, which can be seen a generalisation of O-rating in which influence has a
complex network-structure. So, while in the case of O-rating the restaurant owner
knows exactly how influence flows among the customers, this might not be the case
with P-rating.
Our contribution We analyse the effect of bribing strategies in the case ofO-rating
and P-rating under various constraints, depending on the presence of customers who
do not express any opinion and the knowledge of the network by the service provider:
the exact network is known, the network is known but not the customers’ exact posi-
tion, the network is completely unknown. We show under what conditions the system is
bribery-proof, i.e., there is no bribe yielding a strictly positive expected gain to the ser-
vice provider, and we provide algorithms for the computation of (all) optimal bribing
strategies when they exist.
Intuitively, being able to know and bribe influential customers is crucial for guaran-
teeing a positive expected reward of a bribing strategy. However, while with large pop-
ulations of non-voters “random” bribes can still be profitable, the effect of P-rating is
largely different from that of O-rating and, as we show, the expected profit in the for-
mer can be severely limited and drops below zero in all networks, under certain (mild)
conditions on the cost of bribes.
Our study can be applied to all situations in which individuals influence one another
in the opinion they give and bribery can have a disruptive role in determining collective
decisions.
Related research lines Our approach relates to several research lines in artificial
intelligence, game theory and (computational) social choice Brandt et al. [2015].
Network-based voting and mechanism design We study social networks in which
individuals’ local decisions can be manipulated to modify the resulting global
properties. A similar approach is taken by Apt and Markakis [2014] and Simon and Apt
[2015], which study the changes on a social network needed to make a certain
product adopted among users. Further contributions include rational secret shar-
ing and multi-party computation Abraham et al. [2006], the strategic manipula-
tion of peer reviews Kurokawa et al. [2015], and the growing literature on voting
in social networks Conitzer [2012]; Salehi-Abari and Boutilier [2014]; Elkind
[2014]; Tsang et al. [2015]; Procaccia et al. [2015].
Lobbying and Bribery Our framework features an external agent trying to influence
individual decisions to reach his or her private objectives. Lobbying in decision-
making is an important problem in the area of social choice, from the semi-
nal contribution of Helpman and Persson [1998] to more recent studies in multi-
issue voting Christian et al. [2007]. Bribery is also an established problem whose
computational complexity has been analysed extensively in computational so-
cial choice Faliszewski et al. [2009]; Baumeister et al. [2011]; Bredereck et al.
[2014].
Reputation-based systems We study the aggregation of possibly insincere individ-
ual evaluations by agents that can influence one another through trust relations.
In this sense ours can be seen as a study of reputation in Multi Agent Systems,
2
which has been an important concern of MAS for the past decades Conte and Paolucci
[2002]; Sabater and Sierra [2005]; Garcin et al. [2009]. In particular, our frame-
work treats reputation as a manipulable piece of information, not just a static ag-
gregate of individual opinions, coherently with the work of Conte et al. [2008]
and Pinyol and Sabater-Mir [2013].
Paper structure Section 2 presents the basic setup, introducingO-rating, P-rating
and bribing strategies. Section 3 focusses on O-rating, studying its bribery-proofness
under various knowledge conditions. Section 4 evaluates P-rating against the same
knowledge conditions. In Section 5 we compare the two systems, taking the cost of
bribery into account. We conclude by summarising the main findings and pointing at
future research directions (Section 6).
2 Basic setup
In this section we provide the basic formal definitions.
2.1 Restaurant and customers
Our framework features an object r, called restaurant, being evaluated by a finite non-
empty set of individualsC = {c1, . . . , cn}, called customers. Customers are connected
by a reflexive and symmetric binary relationE ⊆ C×C, called the customers network.
Given a customer c ∈ C we call N(c) = {x ∈ C | (c, x) ∈ E} the neighbourhood of
c, always including c itself.
Customers concurrently submit an evaluation of the restaurant, drawn from a set of
values Val ⊆ [0, 1], together with a distinguished element {∗}, symbolising no opinion.
To facilitate the analysis we assume that {0, 1} ⊆ Val and that Val is closed under the
operation min{1, x+ y} for all x, y ∈ Val. Examples of values are the set [0, 1] itself,
or a discrete assignment of 1 to 5 stars, as common in online rating systems. The vast
majority of known rating methods can be mapped onto the [0, 1] interval and analysed
within our framework.
We represent the evaluation of the customers as a function eval : C → Val ∪ {∗}
and define V ⊆ C as the subset of customers that expresses an evaluation over the
restaurant, i.e., V = {c ∈ C | eval(c) 6= ∗}. We refer to this set as the set of voters and
we assume it to be always non-empty, i.e., there is at least one customer that expresses
an evaluation.
2.2 Two rating systems
In online rating systems such as Tripadvisor R© every interested customer can see - and
is therefore influenced by - (the average of) what the other customers have written. We
call this method O-rating, which stands for objective rating.
Given an evaluation function eval of a restaurant, the associated O-rating is de-
fined as follows:
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O-rating(eval) = avg
c∈V
eval(c)
Where avg is the average function across real-valued eval(c), disregarding ∗. We omit
eval when clear from the context.
O-rating flattens individual evaluations into a unique objective aggregate, the rat-
ing that a certain restaurant is given. What we propose is a refinement of O-rating,
which takes the network of influence into account. In this system customers are only
interested in the evaluation of other customers they can trust, e.g., their friends. We
call our method P-rating, which stands for personalised rating. It is defined for a
pair customer-evaluation (c, eval) as follows:
P-rating(c, eval) = avg
k∈N(c)∩V
eval(k)
So the P-rating(c, eval) calculates what customer c comes to think of the restaurant,
taking the average of the opinions of the customers c is connected to. Again we omit
eval whenever clear from the context.
Observe that in case a customer has no connection with a voter, then P-rating
is not defined. To facilitate the analysis we make the tecnical assumption that each
customer is connected to at least one voter. Also observe that whenE = C×C, i.e., in
case the network is complete and each individual is influenced by each other individual,
then for all c ∈ C and eval we have that P-rating(c, eval) = O-rating(eval).
2.3 Utilities and strategies
We interpret a customer evaluation as a measure of his or her propension to go to the
restaurant. We therefore assume that the utility that a restaurant gets is proportional to
its rating. To simplify the analysis 1 we assume a factor 1 proportionality.
The case of O-rating For the case of O-rating, we assume that the initial utility
u0 of the restaurant is defined as:
u0O = |C|O-rating.
Intuitively, the initial utility amounts to the number of customers that actually go to
the restaurant, weighted with their (average) predisposition.
At the initial stage of the game, the restaurant owner receives u0, and can then
decide to invest a part of it to influence a subset of customers and improve upon the
initial gain. We assume utility to be fully transferrable and, to facilitate the analysis,
that such transfers translate directly into changes of customers’ predispositions.
Definition 1. A strategy is a function σ : C → Val such that∑c∈C σ(c) ≤ u0.
Definition 1 imposes that strategies are budget balanced, i.e., restaurants can only
pay with resources they have.
1Many of our simplifying assumptions bear no consequence for our results, as we will make clear later
on in the paper.
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Let Σ be the set of all strategies. We denote σ0 the strategy that assigns 0 to all
customers and we call bribing strategy any strategy that is different from σ0. After the
execution of a bribing strategy, the evaluation is updated as follows:
Definition 2. The evaluation evalσ(c) after execution of σ is evalσ(c) = min{1, eval(c)+
σ(c)}, where ∗+ σ(c) = σ(c).
In this definition we are making the assumption that the effect of bribing a non-voter to
vote is equivalent to that of bribing a voter that had a 0-level review, as, intuitively, the
individual has no associated predisposition to go to the restaurant.
A strategy is called efficient if σ(c) + eval(c) ≤ 1 for all c ∈ C. Let B(σ) = {c ∈
C | σ(c) 6= 0} be the set of bribed customers. Let V σ be the set of voters after the
execution of σ. Executing σ induces the following change in utility:
uσO = |C|O-rating(evalσ)−
∑
c∈C
σ(c).
Intuitively, uσ
O
is obtained by adding to the initial utility of the restaurant the rating
obtained as an effect of the money invested on each individual minus the amount of
money spent.
We define the revenue of a strategy σ as the marginal utility obtained by executing
it:
Definition 3. Let σ be a strategy. The revenue of σ is defined as rO(σ) = uσO−u0. We
say that σ is profitable if rO(σ) > 0.
Finally, we recall the standard notion of dominance:
Definition 4. A strategy σ is weakly dominant if uσ
O
≥ uσ
′
O
for all σ′∈Σ. It is strictly
dominant if uσ
O
> uσ
′
O
for all σ∈Σ.
Hence a non-profitable strategy is never strictly dominant.
The case of P-rating The previous definitions can be adapted to the case of
P-rating as follows:
u0P =
∑
c∈C
P-rating(c, eval)
which encodes the initial utility of each restaurant, and
uσP =
∑
c∈C
P-rating(c, evalσ)−
∑
c∈C
σ(c)
which encodes the utility change after the execution of a σ. Finally, let the revenue
of σ be rP(σ) = uσP − u0P. If clear from the context, we use P-rating
σ(c) for
P-rating(evalσ, c).
In order to determine the dominant strategies, we need to establish how the cus-
tomers vote, how they are connected, and what the restaurant owner knows. In this
paper we assume that the restaurant knows eval, leaving the interesting case when eval
is unknown to future work. We focus instead on the following cases: the restaurant
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knows the network, the restaurant knows the shape of the network but not the individ-
uals’ position, and the network is unknown. We analyse the effect of bribing strategies
on P-rating in each such case. Notice how for the case of O-rating the cases col-
lapse to the first. We also look at the special situation in which every customer is a
voter.
Given a set of such assumptions, we say that O-rating (or P-rating) are bribery-
proof under those assumptions if σ0 is weakly dominant.
3 Bribes under O-rating
In this section we look at bribing strategies underO-rating, first focussing on the case
where everyone expresses an opinion, then moving on to the more general case.
3.1 All vote
Let us now consider the case in which V = C. Recall that B(σ) is the set of customers
bribed by σ. We say that two strategies σ1 and σ2 are disjoint if B(σ1) ∪ B(σ2) = ∅.
The revenue of disjoint strategies exhibits the following property:
Lemma 1. If V = C and σ1 and σ2 are two disjoint strategies, then rO(σ1 ◦ σ2) =
rO(σ1) + rO(σ2).
Proof sketch. Follows from direct calculations and the observation that the set of cus-
tomers C is obtained by partitioning into a set of non-bribed individuals, B(σ1) of
individuals bribed by σ1 and B(σ2) of individuals bribed by σ2.
We now show that bribing a single individual is not profitable.
Lemma 2. Let σ be a bribing strategy, V = C and |B(σ)| = 1. Then, rO(σ) ≤ 0, i.e.,
σ is not profitable.
Proof sketch. Let c¯ be the only individual such that σ(c¯) 6= 0. By calculation, r(σ) =
uσ
O
−u0
O
= O-ratingσ−O-rating−
∑
c σ(c) = min{1, eval(c¯)+σ(c¯)}−eval(c¯)−
σ(c¯) ≤ 0.
By combining the two lemmas above we are able to show that no strategy is profitable
for bribing the O-rating.
Proposition 3. If V = C, then no strategy is profitable.
Proof. Let σ be an arbitrary bribing strategy. Clearly, we have that σ = σc1 ◦ · · · ◦
σcn , where for each cj ∈ C the function σcj (c) = σ(c) if c = cj and σcj (c) =
0 otherwise. As all σcj are pairwise disjoint strategies, by Lemma 1 we know that
rO(σ) =
∑
c rO(σc). By Lemma 2, we know that for all c ∈ C we have that rO(σc) ≤
0, and we can thus conclude that rO(σ) ≤ 0, showing the desired result.
From this it follows that σ0 is weakly dominant and thusO-rating bribery-proof when
all customers voted.
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3.2 Non voters
Let us now consider the case of V ⊂ C, i.e., when there is at least one customer who
is not a voter. In this case Lemma 1 no longer holds, as shown in this example:
Example 1. LetC = {A,B,C}, and let eval(A) = 0.5, eval(B) = 0.5, and eval(C) =
∗. The initial resources are u0 = O-rating × 3 = 1.5. Let now σ1(A) = 0.5
and σ1(B) = σ1(C) = 0, and let σ2(C) = 0.5 and σ2(A) = σ2(B) = 0. Now
uσ1
O
= 0.75×3−0.5 = 1.75 and uσ2
O
= 0.5×3−0.5 = 1, but uσ1◦σ2
O
= 0.6¯×3−1 = 1.
The example (in particular σ1) also shows that O-rating in this case is not bribery-
proof.
We now turn to characterise the set of undominated bribing strategies. We begin
by showing that bribing a non-voter is always dominated. Let first σ be a strategy such
that σ(c¯) 6= 0 for some c ∈ C \V and recall that V σ is the set of voters after execution
of σ. Let us define the c-greedy restriction of σ to be any strategy σ−c¯ such that:
• V σ
−c¯
= V σ \ c, i.e., the greedy restriction eliminates c¯ from the set of voters.
• For each c ∈ V σ \ c, max(1, eval(c) + σ(c)) = max(1, eval(c) + σ−c¯(c)), i.e.,
the greedy restriction does not waste further resources.
• If there exists c ∈ V σ \ c such that eval(c) + σ−c¯(c) < 1 then
∑
c∈C σ
−c¯(c) =∑
c∈C σ(c), i.e., the σ−c¯ redistributes σ(c¯) among the remaining voters.
We now show that each strategy bribing a non-voter is strictly dominated by any of its
greedy restrictions.
Proposition 4. Let V 6= C, and c¯ ∈ C \ V . Then each strategy σ with σ(c) 6= 0 is
strictly dominated by σ−c¯.
Proof. Let σ be a strategy with σ(c) 6= 0 for some non-voter c, and let σ−c¯ be one of
its greedy restriction defined above.
uσ
−c¯
O − u
σ
O =
|C|(O-ratingσ
−c¯
−O-ratingσ)+
∑
c∈C
σ(c)−
∑
c∈C
σ−c¯(c) =
|C|(
∑
c∈C eval
σ−c¯(c)
|V |
−
∑
c∈C eval
σ(c)
|V ∪ c|
) +
+(
∑
c∈C
σ(c) −
∑
c∈C
σ−c¯(c))
Observe first that σ−c¯ is a redistribution, hence
∑
c σ(c) −
∑
c σ
−c¯(c) ≥ 0, i.e., the
second addendum in the above equation is positive. Consider now the case where there
exists c ∈ V σ\c such that eval(c)+σ−c¯(c) < 1. Then by the definition of σ−c¯ we have
that
∑
c∈V σ eval
σ(c) =
∑
c∈V σ
−c¯ evalσ
−c¯
(c), i.e., the greedy restriction preserves the
overall evaluation. By straightforward calculation this entails that uσ−c¯
O
− uσ
O
> 0. If
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no such c exists, and therefore O-ratingσ
−c¯
= 1 we have that either O-ratingσ < 1
or, by the efficiency requirement and the fact that σ(c) 6= 0, we have that
∑
c∈C σ(c) >∑
c∈C σ
−c¯(c). In either cases we have that uσ−c¯
O
− uσ
O
> 0.
Let an O-greedy strategy be any efficient strategy that redistributes all the initial re-
sources u0
O
among voters. Making use of the previous result, we are able to characterise
the set of all dominant strategies for O-rating.
Proposition 5. Let V 6= C. A strategy is weakly dominant for O-rating if and only if
it is an O-greedy strategy.
Proof sketch. For the right-to-left direction, first observe that all O-greedy strategies
are payoff-equivalent, and that a non-efficient strategy is always dominated by its ef-
ficient counterpart. By Proposition 4 we know that strategies bribing non-voters are
dominated, and by straightforward calculations we obtain that in presence of non-voters
it is always profitable to bribe as much as possible. For the left-to-right direction, ob-
serve that a non-greedy strategy is either inefficient, or it bribes a non-voter, or does
not bribe as much as possible. In either circumstance it is strictly dominated.
Proposition 5 gives us a polynomial algorithm to find all weakly dominant strate-
gies under O-rating: starting from an evaluation vector eval, distribute all available
resources u0
O
to the voters, without exceeding the maximal evaluation of 1. By either
exhausting the available budget or distributing it all, we are guaranteed the maximum
gain by Proposition 5.
4 Bribes under P-rating
In this section we look at bribing strategies underP-rating, against various knowledge
conditions on the social network. As for Section 3 we start by looking at the case where
everyone votes and later on allowing non voters. Before doing that, we introduce a
useful graph-theoretic measure of influence.
Definition 5. The influence weight of a customer c ∈ C in a network E is defined as
follows:
wc =
∑
k∈N(c)∩V
1
|N(k) ∩ V |
Intuitively, each individual’s rating influences the rating of each of its connections, with
a factor that is inversely proportional to the number of second-level connections. We
formalise this statement in the following lemma, which is restricted to strategies that
only bribe voters:
Lemma 6. Let B(σ) ⊆ V . The utility obtained by playing σ with P-rating is uσ
P
=∑
c∈C wc × eval
σ(c)−
∑
c∈C σ(c).
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Proof. By calculation:
uσP +
∑
c∈C
σ(c) =
∑
c∈C
P-rating(c) =
∑
c∈C
avg
k∈N(c)
evalσ(k) =
=
∑
c∈C
1
|N(c) ∪ V |
∑
k∈N(c)∪V
evalσ(k) =
=
∑
c∈C
[
evalσ(c)×
∑
k∈N(c)∩V
1
|N(k) ∩ V |
]
=
=
∑
c∈C
wc × evalσ(c)
In particular, when V = C, we obtain wc =
∑
k∈N(c)
1
deg(k) , where deg(c) = |N(c)|
is the degree of c in E.
4.1 All vote, known network
We begin by studying the simplest case in which the restaurant knows the evaluation
eval, the network E as well as the position of each customer on the network. The
following corollary is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 6:
Corollary 7. Let V = C and let σ1 and σ2 be two disjoint strategies, then rP(σ1 ◦
σ2) = rP(σ1) + rP(σ2).
We are now able to show a precise characterisation of the revenue obtained by any
efficient strategy σ:
Proposition 8. Let V = C, letE be a known network, and let σ be an efficient strategy.
Then rP(σ) =
∑
c∈C(wc − 1)σ(c).
Proof. By calculation, where Step (2) uses Lemma 6, and Step (4) uses the fact that σ
is efficient:
rP(σ) = u
σ
P − u
0
P = (1)
= [
∑
c∈C
wc evalσc −
∑
c∈C
σ(c)−
∑
c∈C
wc eval(c)] = (2)
=
∑
c∈C
[
wc [min{1, eval(c) + σ(c)} − eval(c)]
]
− (3)
−
∑
c∈C
σ(c) =
∑
c∈C
(wc − 1)σ(c). (4)
Proposition 8 has a number of important consequences. It tells us that the factorswc
are crucial in determining the revenue of given bribing strategy. Bribing a customer c
is profitable whenever wc>1 (provided its evaluation was not already 1), while bribing
a customer c with wc≤1 is at most as profitable as doing nothing. Most importantly, it
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shows that P-rating is not bribery-proof when the restaurant knows both the network
and the customers’ evaluations.
Given a network E and an evaluation vector eval, let Algorithm 1 define the P-
greedy bribing strategy.
Input: Evaluation function eval and network E
Output: A bribing strategy σG
P
: C → Val
Budget=u0
P
σG
P
(c) = 0 for all c ∈ C
Compute wc for all c ∈ C
Sort c ∈ C in descending order c0, . . . , cm based on wc
for i=0,. . . ,m do
if Budget6= 0 then
if wci > 1 then
σG
P
(ci) = min{1− eval(ci),Budget}
Budget=Budget-σG
P
(ci)
end
end
return σG
P
end
Algorithm 1: The P-greedy bribing strategy σG
P
As a consequence of Proposition 8 we obtain:
Corollary 9. The P-greedy bribing strategy defined in Algorithm 1 is weakly dominant.
As in the case of O-rating, Corollary 9 has repercussions on the computational
complexity of bribery: it shows that computing a weakly dominant strategy can be
done in polynomial time. Notice how the most costly operation lies in the computation
of the influence weights wc, which can be performed only once, assuming the network
is static. Similar problems, such as recognising whether bribing a certain individual
is profitable, or estimating whether individuals on a network can be bribed above a
certain threshold, are also computable in polynomial time.
4.2 All vote, unknown network
We now move to study the more complex case of an unknown network. Surprisingly,
we are able to show that no bribing strategy is profitable (in expectation), and hence
P-rating is bribery-proof in this case. Recall that we are still assuming that the restau-
rant knows eval and everybody voted.
We begin by assuming that the restaurant knows the structure of the network, but
not the position of each participant. Formally, the restaurant knows E, but considers
possible any permutation of the customers in C overE. Let us thus define the expected
revenue of a strategy σ over a given network E as the average over all possible permu-
tations of customers: E[rP(σ)] =
∑
1
n! [u
σ
ρ − u
0
ρ], where we abuse notation by writing
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uσρ as u
σ
P
under permutation ρ over the network E. What we are able to show is that all
strategies are at most as profitable as σ0 in expected return:
Proposition 10. Let V = C, let the network structure of E be known but not the
relative positions of customers on E. Then E[rP(σ)] = 0 for all strategies σ.
Proof sketch. Let |C| = n. We show the result for any strategy σ that bribes a single
customer c¯. The general statement follows from the linearity of E[r(σ)]. Equation (5)
uses Proposition 8 to compute the revenue for each permutation ρ:
E[σ] =
∑
ρ
1
n!
(uσρ − u
0
ρ) =
∑
ρ
1
n!
(wρ(c¯) − 1)σ(c¯) = (5)
=
∑
c∈C
(n− 1)!
n!
(wc − 1)σ(c¯) =
(n− 1)!
n!
∑
c∈C
(wc − 1) = 0 (6)
The last line follows from the observation that
∑
cwc = |C| and hence
∑
c(wc−1) =
0, by a consequence of Definition 5 when everybody votes.
Hence, if we assume a uniform probability over all permutations of customers on
the network, a straightforward consequence of Proposition 10 concludes that it is not
profitable (in expectation) to bribe customers.
Corollary 11. If V = C and the network is unknown, then no strategy σ is profitable
in expected return.
4.3 Non voters, known network
In the presence of non-voters, the situation is different than in the case of O-rating.
We show that it is possible to find a network where bribing a non-voter is profitable:
Example 2. Consider 4 individuals {B,C,D,E} connected only to a non-voter in the
middle. Let eval(j) = 0.2 for all j but the center. We have u0
P
= 1. Let A be the
non-voter, and let σ1(A) = 1 and 0 otherwise. The utility of σ1 is:
P-rating
σ1(A) + 4P-ratingσ1(j)− 1 = 1.76
All other strategies can be shown to be dominated by σ1. Take for instance a strategy σ2
such that σ2(B) = 0.8, σ2(C) = 0.2 and 0 otherwise. The utility of σ2 is uσ2P = 1.25.
It is quite hard to obtain analytical results for strategies bribing non-voters, due to
the non-linearity of theP-rating in this setting. We can however provide results in line
with those of the previous section if we restrict to voter-only strategies, i.e., strategies
σ such that σ(c) = 0 for all c 6∈ V . In this case, a similar proof to Proposition 8 shows
the following:
Proposition 12. Let V 6= C, E be a known network, and σ be an efficient bribing
strategy such that B(σ) ⊆ V . Then, rP(σ) =
∑
c∈C(wc − 1)σ(c).
The difference with the case of V = C is thatwc can be arbitrarily large in the presence
of non-voters, such as in our Example 2. Most importantly, we have that
∑
c(wc − 1)
can be bigger than 0, which bears important consequences in the case of unknown
positions presented next.
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A0.2 B0.2
C*
C* A0.2
B0.2
B0.2 C*
A0.2
Figure 1: The three permutations of customers on a network in Example 3.
4.4 Non voters, unknown positions
Unlike the case of V = C, in this case it is possible to define bribing strategies that are
profitable (in expected return).
Example 3. Let C = {A,B,C}, and the initial evaluation eval(A) = eval(B) = 0.2
and eval(C) = ∗. Assume that the structure of the network is known, but the position
of the individuals is not. Let the three possible network positions (without counting the
symmetries) be depicted in Figure 1. Let σ(B) = 0.2 and σ(A) = σ(C) = 0. In the
first case:
r
1
P (σ)=P-rating(A) + ...+ P-rating(C)− 0.2− u
0
P =
= 0.3 + 0.3 + 0.4− 0.2− 0.6 = 0.2
In the second case r2
P
(σ) = 0 while in the third:
r
3
P (σ) = 0.4 + 0.3 + 0.2− 0.2− 0.6 = 0.1
Therefore, P-rating is not bribery-proof (in expectation) in the presence of non-
voters when the network is unknown. Interesting computational problems open up in
this setting, such as identifying the networks that allow for profitable bribing strategies,
and their expected revenue.
5 Boundaries of bribery-proofness
The previous sections have shown that having a network-based rating systems, where
individuals are influenced by their peers, is not bribery-proof, even when the position
of individuals in a given network is not known. However bribing strategies have a
different effect in the overall score. While the utility of O-rating is a sum of the
global average of voters’ evaluation, the utility of P-ratingis a sum of local averages
of voters’ evalution against the one of their peers.
Therefore a strategy bribing one voter affects everyone in the case of O-rating,
but it can be shown to have a limited effect in the case of P-rating.
Proposition 13. Let σ be an efficient strategy s.t. |B(σ)| = 1, and let c¯ be such that
σ(c) 6= 0. Then rP(σ) < N(c¯).
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Proof. By calculation, we have that:
rP(σ) =
∑
c∈C
P-rating
σ(c)−σ(c¯)−
∑
c∈C
P-rating(c) =
∑
c′∈N(c¯)
P-rating
σ(c)− σ(c¯)−
∑
c′∈N(c¯)
P-rating(c) ≤
≤ 1 ×N(c¯)− σ(c¯)−
∑
c′∈N(c¯)
P-rating(c) < N(c¯)
The previous result shows that increasing the number of individuals that are not
connected to an agent that is bribed, even if these are non-voters, does not increase the
revenue of the bribing strategy. This is not true when we use O-rating.
Proposition 14. Let σ be an efficient strategy. The revenue rO(σ) of σ is monotonically
increasing with the number of non-voters, and is unbounded.
Proof. It follows from our definitions that:
rO(σ) = (
|C|
|V σ|
− 1)
[∑
c∈C
eval(c) + σ(c)
]
The above figure is unbounded and monotonically increasing in the number of non-
voters, which can be obtained by increasing C keeping V σ fixed.
So while P-rating and O-rating are not bribery-proof in general it turns out that
the impact of the two in the overall network are significantly different. In particular,
under realistic assumptions such as a very large proportion of non voters and with par-
ticipants having a few connections, bribing under O-rating is increasingly rewarding,
while under P-rating this is no longer the case.
6 Conclusive remarks
We introduced P-rating, a network-based rating system which generalises the com-
monly used O-rating, and analysed their resistance to external bribery under various
knowledge conditions. The main take-home message of our contribution can be sum-
marised in one point, deriving from our main results:
P-rating and O-rating are not bribery-proof in general. However, if we assume
that a service provider has a cost for bribing an individual, there are situations in which
P-rating is fully bribery proof, while O-rating is not. For instance, if the cost of
bribing an individual c is at least N(c) then P-rating is bribery-proof. As observed
previously, this is not necessarily true for O-rating. In particular, if we assume the
presence of unreachable individuals the difference is more significant. As shown, for
P-rating we need to bribe individuals with wc > 1. With O-rating is sufficient to
find one voter who accepts a bribe.
It is very important to keep in mind that mixtures of O-rating and P-rating (e.g.,
providing users with both figures) will not guarantee bribery-proofness in expected
return.
13
There is a number of avenues open to future research investigation. The most im-
portant ones include the case of partially known customers’ evaluation, and the study of
ratings of multiple restaurants, where the probability of a customer choosing a restau-
rant determines his or her probability not to choose the others.
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